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Rising Tides of Ideological Simplifications. A Comparative and
Longitudinal Analysis of Local Parties
Abstract
This article explores the strength and causal determinants of ideological thinking within Swiss local
political parties. The concept of “ideologization” refers to (1): “horizontal couplings”, as they are
manifested in intercorrelations between different opinions, and to (2) “vertical couplings” of specific
opinions to abstract concepts of “left” and “right”. Results show high ideologization on the left-center
section of the LR-scale, especially in the vertical dimension. On both sides of the spectrum, ideological
constraints are significantly higher in larger communities than in than in smaller ones. Only in rather
small communities, does ideologization correlate positively with the educational level, the modern
occupational background of party members and the number of other local parties with which they have
to compete. In communities of given size, ideological thinking is more pronounced when parties possess
a small share of political power. Finally, it is found that ideological constraints have increased
somewhat between 1989 and 2002.
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This article explores the strength and causal determinants of ideological thinking 
within Swiss local political parties. The concept of “ideologization” refers to (1): 
“horizontal couplings”, as they are manifested in intercorrelations between different 
opinions, and to (2) “vertical couplings” of specific opinions to abstract concepts of 
“left” and “right”. Results show high ideologization on the left-center section of the 
LR-scale, especially in the vertical dimension. On both sides of the spectrum, ideologi-
cal constraints are significantly higher in larger communities than in than in smaller 
ones. Only in rather small communities, does ideologization correlate positively with 
the educational level, the modern occupational background of party members and 
the number of other local parties with which they have to compete. In communities 
of given size, ideological thinking is more pronounced when parties possess a small 
share of political power. Finally, it is found that ideological constraints have increased 
somewhat between 1989 and 2002.
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“Ideology” as an Ambiguous Concept
In everyday talk as well as in political and scientific discourses, the term 
“ideology” has ambiguous connotations.
On the one hand, “ideological thinking” denotes a tendency to cling 
to rigid mental stereotypes instead of recognizing the reality and adapting 
pragmatically to situational conditions, to evaluate all issues according to 
the same monistic guidelines instead of judging each on its own intrinsic 
merits, and to identify with ready-made collectivistic opinion patterns in-
stead of relying on one’s own capacity of autonomous thought.
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On the other hand, there is also a long tradition in social science to see 
ideology in a much more positive way: as a correlate of higher intellectual 
sophistication. In this view, ideological thinking is characterized by high 
stability, internal logical coherence and consistency, based on the capacity 
to relate specific issues to more abstract principles and to organize different 
attitudes to logically consistent wholes (Converse 1964; Gerring 1997).
This view gave rise to the notion that people with high political interest 
and expertise are most likely to structure attitudes toward political issues 
in ideologically consistent ways (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Federico 
and Schneider 2007), while most ordinary citizens (especially the less edu-
cated) lack ideological thinking because their political views are found to 
be incoherent, volatile and logically flawed (Bishop 2005; Converse 1964; 
Nie and Anderson 1974; McGuire 1985, 1999).
However, this “rationalistic” perspective has been heavily attacked by 
psychologists who again stress the importance of non-rational factors in 
the genesis of ideological thought. For instance, Federico and Schneider 
criticise such views as unduly “cognitivistic” and stress the importance of 
motivational factors in processes of ideological structuring (Federico and 
Schneider 2007). Similarly, Jost et al. have argued that ideological thinking 
may well derive its internal coherence not from logics, but “acquires co-
herence and structure from psychological needs, motives, and constraints 
that vary both situationally and dispositionally” (Jost et al. 2008).
Especially “conservatism” has been widely interpreted as a highly syn-
thetic world view that encompasses a wide range of world-views, values 
and attitudes related to basic personality characteristics like “authoritarian-
ism” (Adorno et al. 1950), “need for cognitive closure” (Kruglanski and 
Webster 1996), anxiety arising from mortality salience (Greenberg et al. 
1990), “intolerance of ambiguity” (Kirton 1978), “uncertainty avoidance” 
(Jost et al. 2008) or simple “fear of change” (Rossiter 1968).
While psychologists are professionally disposed to focus on intraperson-
al motivations and dispositions, sociologists are more inclined to include 
factors related to social interaction, collective group formation, society and 
culture. Adopting this perspective, it is fascinating to learn that there are 
pronounced differences between various segments of societal elites. Thus, 
it has been found that highly consistent belief systems are highly pro-
nounced among cultural elites, while they are less prevalent among elites 
highly involved in (political or economic) decisions (Lerner et al. 1991). 
This regularity may indicate that high involvement in powerful roles may 
be incompatible with the maintenance of ideological consistency because 
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there is too much need to do justice to each particular problem and to adapt 
to issue-specific and situational conditions.
Left-right Ideology: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues
While originating from mutually very distant disciplines (like sociology, 
psychology, sociology and political science), most studies on ideology 
converge in the point that ideological thinking in politics is mainly organ-
ized along a single dimension spanning between “conservative vs. “lib-
eral” or “left” vs. “right”.
A wealth of empirical evidence shows that most citizens in most de-
veloped democratic countries are willing and able to place themselves on 
the left-right dimension: a scale usually ranging from 1–10 or from 0–10. 
(Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Colomer and Escatel 2004: 3). Similarly, 
voters as well as political elites use the LR scale for characterizing social 
movements, political parties, candidates, news media, issue positions, po-
litical programs and governing regimes.
Like the top-bottom model of social stratification, the LR scheme is a 
simple spatial metaphor that has the characteristic of being translatable in 
all languages and being potentially adopted by all human cultures (Laponce 
1981: 27).
The ubiquity of such one-dimensional schemes is best explained by 
the “functionalist” theory which assumes that the salience of the LR con-
tinuum is particularly high under conditions of high political complexity 
and low political information (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). As a starting 
premise, the theory assumes that most people spend little efforts for acquir-
ing and synthesizing political information, because they have little skills to 
do that or no time available. The salience of the left-right dimension can be 
minimal in two party systems, because party preferences can easily be built 
up without referring to ideological notions. In more complex and com-
petitive multiparty systems, citizens tend to rely on rather simple heuristic 
shortcuts in order to reach non-ambiguous voting decisions with a mini-
mum of personal efforts (Berelson et al. 1954; McKelvey and Ordeshook 
1986; Neuman 1986; Popkin 1994; Hinich and Munger 1994), and parties 
will use ideology as an indispensable tool for “branding their products” in 
political campaigns (Downs 1957; Colomer and Escatel 2004).
In conformity with Converse’s observation that highly educated and 
politically interested individuals were more inclined to think in ideologi-
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cal terms (Converse 1964), various more recent studies have shown that 
politically sophisticated individuals are better able to make use of political 
labels like “left” and “right” because they are better informed about their 
meaning (Sniderman et al. 1991; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Klinge-
mann 1979; etc.), and that issue positions and left-right self placements are 
more tightly correlated when the level of political cognition is high (e. g. 
Inglehart and Klingemann 1976).
The astonishing permanency of the spatial left-right metaphor contrasts 
sharply with extreme variations of the meanings associated with these two 
terms during history and across different cultures. In the early 19th century, 
leftism was mainly associated with individualism, free enterprise, national 
independence and – following Rousseau – an endeavour to restore perfect 
form of human society as it had presumably existed in the past (Laponce 
1981: 118ff.).
Between about 1850 and 1960, it was almost exclusively amalgamated 
to socialist and communist ideologies associated with the various labour 
movements – thus giving priority to questions of economic organization, 
class relations and social welfare. In the late sixties, the civil rights move-
ments and the student revolts gave rise to a new, more encompassing 
understanding of leftism (or: “radicalism”): including the perspective of 
extending basic standards of human rights and welfare to all kinds of dis-
criminated population segments (like non-whites, females, gays, starving 
poor in underdeveloped nations etc.). Within the same time period, ecolo-
gist issues gained increased prominence on political agendas and were in-
corporated in programs aiming to catalyze societal and economic change. 
Finally, processes of globalization and regional supranational integration 
(within Europe) have given rise to new controversies where basic strate-
gies of foreign policy are at stake.
However, there is no agreement whether all these “postmaterialist” is-
sues become increasingly assimilated to “leftism”, or whether they are the 
nucleus of a second (orthogonal) ideological dimension.
On the one hand, there is considerable evidence that no amalgamation 
is taking place. Thus, Terry N. Clark assumes that rising affluence and 
intergenerational change contribute to a growing salience of “social value 
issues” which constitute “a distinct political dimension from more tradi-
tional economic or fiscal issues.” (Clark et al. 1993: 305). In contrast to 
socialist collectivism, this new “social liberalism” is more associated with 
individualism: implying an affirmative position toward markets and pri-
vate actions, and a growing skepticism toward governmental bureaucracy. 
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(Clark and Inglehart 1998). In a similar vein, Kitschelt has argued that in 
addition to the traditional LR dimension, a second axis extending between 
an “authoritarian” and a “libertarian” pole is gaining weight (Kitschelt 
1994). Besides social liberalism, ecologism is also said to constitute a new 
ideological dimension less and less associated with conventional radical-
ism (Kessel and Tischler 1984). Finally, Simon Hix and Fritz Scharpf claim 
that processes of European integration have given rise to a new dimension 
that divides those who favor this process from those who want to preserve 
national autonomy (Hix 1999; Scharpf 1996).
On a more fundamental level, it has been argued that modern political 
parties are generally moving away from ideological programs in order to 
include broader voter segments no longer committed to traditional “mi-
lieus” and “Weltanschauungen” as they have structured the political land-
scape until the 1960s. Kirchheimer’s (1965) “catch all party”, Katz and 
Mair’s (1995) “cartel party” as well as von Beyme’s (2000) “professional 
electoral party” (professionelle Wählerpartei) and Lösche’s conceptions 
of “Volksparteien” as “loosely coupled anarchies” share the notion that 
successful current parties tend to adapt pragmatically to a heterogeneous 
and volatile electorate, so that all traditional ideological patterns tend to 
decay (Hofmann 2003). All these notions also converge with the argument 
that the “mediatization” of modern elections promotes a shift from issue-
centered to candidate-centered campaigning (Niedermayer 2000) as well 
as a tendency “that parties propagate positive product attributes and a uni-
versalized competence instead of sharply defined programmatic profiles.” 
(Schulz 1998: 378).
On the other hand, there is also evidence that attitudes toward “old” and 
“new” political issues are significantly interrelated, and that this linkage 
has not been eroded by either socio-economic development or intergen-
erational change. Thus many Western countries (particularly in Europe) 
have seen the emergence of “red-green parties” which combine ecological 
and social liberalist standings with pronounced leftist positions in all tra-
ditional domains (e.g. in economic and social policy) (Poguntke 1987). In 
Germany, the trend toward washed-out “peoples parties” (Volksparteien) 
seems to be broken by the shifts from the CDU and SPD to smaller parties 
which maintain more pronounced and consistent ideological profiles: “Die 
Grünen” which combine strict ecological standings with a broad spectrum 
of more classical leftist positions; and “Die Linke” which is committed to a 
very general subordination of the economy under political power (Jun and 
Kreikenbom and Neu 2006: 13ff.).
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In a sophisticated empirical study, Weakliem (1991) has shown that 
the “materialist” and the “postmaterialist” dimension of political ideology 
show considerable values of interfactor correlations (between 0.40 and 
0.60). According to Inglehart, the functional needs for organizing politics 
along a single “left-right”-dimension are so imperative that – in the long 
run at least – postmaterialistic issues will become assimilated to this di-
mension rather than evolving to an independent second ideological axis 
(Inglehart 1984: 37). All this conforms to Sani and Sartori’s and Bobbio’s 
view that Left and Right are just “empty containers” that can be filled with 
various meanings by anybody (Sani and Sartori 1983; Bobbio 1996).
In several other empirical studies, it was found that rather tight correla-
tions between issue positions and left-right self ratings exist for the left half 
of the continuum, while on the right side, the explanatory power of politi-
cal attitudes is much reduced. As Laponce concludes from his meta-analy-
sis, this is true for most issues conventionally related to the LR-continuum: 
e.g. attitudes toward economic regulation, nationalism or gender equality 
(Laponce 1981: 158ff.). As the author himself has verified in a study on lo-
cal parties in Switzerland, the same is also true for items related to financial 
policy, immigration policy or environmental protection (Geser 1992).
In the era of conventional class politics, ideological cores were suf-
ficiently defined by stable interests deriving from the position of collec-
tivities within the socio-economic system. In postmaterialist ages where 
particular interests are substituted by generalized “values”, this specificity 
and stability has evidently been lost. Instead, ideologies have become more 
dependent on
subjective personal factors and character traits (e. g. “conservative” 
mentalities characterized by high security needs and low tolerance 
of ambiguity);
divergences conditioned by cultural traditions (as they are currently 
manifested in the different attitudes of European countries toward 
nuclear power);
fads and fashions, which may dominate the political agenda for tran-
sitory periods.
Consequently, we may well see a higher variability of “leftisms” and 
“rightisms” in the future, while the degree of ideological cohesiveness may 
•
•
•
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well remain the same, because the same needs for simplification are per-
sisting on the individual as well as on the political level.
However, it cannot be denied that all these different issues are too het-
erogeneous (and too variable) to be part of a logically consistent ideo-
logical belief system.1 For instance: if it’s true that conservatives have an 
increased need for security: why are they more prone to carry the risks con-
nected with nuclear power plants? And why are leftist parties fighting so 
vigorously for the abandonment of atomic energy, when this results in such 
cost increases for electricity that they risk to lose their traditional electorate 
(lower social strata).
Similarly, it is not evident that attitudes toward EU membership and 
European integration have become a left-right issue in many countries. 
Why are the leftist (e. g. in Switzerland) in favor of such a project which 
is associated with so many developments they don’t appreciate: the liber-
alization of trade and labour markets, the intensified fight against immigra-
tion from Southern countries; the demise of national worker protection?2 
If highly educated strata are more prone to maintain tight constraints 
among opinions to all these issues: why does this indicate that their think-
ing is in any way more sophisticated than the less interrelated attitudes of 
less educated citizens? Doesn’t this manifest just the contrary: that edu-
cated people are more disposed to take over ready-made collective stereo-
types that to rely on autonomous individual reflection, more eager to create 
in-group conformity than to generate guidelines for pragmatic judgments 
and decisions?
Swiss Local �arties as a �ield for Studying “Ideological Cultures”        
The following empirical study intends to shed a light on the actual ideo-
logical culture in Swiss politics as it is reflected in the issue positions of 
local political parties. 
In contrast to the general “political culture” which encompasses more 
basic “rules of the game”, ideological cultures may be seen as more vari-
1 Thus, the “new social movements” themselves never produced a coherent encompassing 
ideology comparable to Marxism and Socialism in the case of the labour movement (see 
Brand et al. 1984).
2 A special case here is Sweden where leftists are more EU-critical because they fear lowe-
ring welfare standards.
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able pattern co-varying with long-term changes of societal value systems 
as well as more short-term developments on the level of social movements, 
salient issues or attitudinal “fashions”. Nevertheless, the concept of “ideo-
logical culture” implies the existence of collective political perspectives, 
values and goals governing the behavior of individuals and organizations 
that are transmitted by regular processes of socialization.
In general, average individual citizens are rather poor informants of 
“culture” because their thinking is heavily shaped by psychological idio-
syncrasies and because they often lack the cognitive and intellectual capac-
ities needed to perceive and interpret these collective patterns adequately.
Studying politically active elites may be a better approach, but it is still 
assumed that cultural patterns are adequately mirrored in the subjective 
consciousness of individual minds.
By studying groups and organizations, more justice can be done to the 
basic fact that culture is primarily expressed in the outcomes of collective 
communications and activities: e.g. in the explicit results of discussions, 
negotiations and deliberative procedures, in formally stated decisions and 
action programs or at least in mutually recognized “majority opinions”.
Political parties have particularly strong links to ideological culture. It 
can be expected that party groupings will tend to maintain more consistent 
and integrative ideological standings than individuals, because 
a. it is their job to aggregate the attitudes of their divergent mem-
bers and factions into explicit action programs and specific po-
litical decisions;
b. their visible public status sets them under high pressure to be 
consistent in order to appeal to potential voters or adherents 
(Colomer and Escatel 2004).
This implies that high intercorrelations between different issue opinions 
(like “socialism” and “ecologism”) among parties may not at all reflect a 
similar covariance on the level of their individual members: but rather their 
particular success in aggregating “socialist factions” and “ecological fac-
tions” into an overarching party platform (e.g. for simple tactical reasons 
of winning elections).
In an even wider and longer perspective, political parties can be seen as 
active agents that define for everybody else in society what is the (current) 
meaning of “left” and “right” (Potter 2001: 6).
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Local party sections have the additional virtues of being so numerous 
that rigorous multivariate methods of comparative analysis can be applied, 
and of being so low in organizational complexity that a single central mem-
ber is well able to deliver all the relevant information.
Switzerland is outstanding for the fact that formalized part groupings 
are astonishingly widespread even among very tiny municipalities, and 
that they control to a high degree all major political processes on the com-
munal level (Geser et al. 1994).
Given the mix between direct and representative democracy typical for 
Swiss politics, most of these local parties have the dual function of in-
fluencing elections on the one hand and decisions about specific political 
issues on the other. With a total number of about 200’000 participative 
adherents (equal to about 5% of Swiss voters), these groupings encompass 
the major part of all politically active citizen in the country. 
It might be objected that the community level is not adequate for study-
ing political ideology, because smaller settings are generally prone to avoid 
overt political conflict (Vidich and Bensman 1968; Black 1974), and be-
cause municipal issues are often seen as mere technical and administrative 
problems not subject to struggles between political parties (Banfield and 
Wilson 1965; Geser 2003). In the United States, even larger cities have 
been affected by the “progressive reform movement” which reinforced 
nonpartisan managerial conceptions of city government dedicated general 
“community welfare”, not to the interest of particular groupings and elec-
toral clienteles (Kemp 1999); and in many European countries, it is found 
that instead of competing polarized party systems, inclusive “consocia-
tional governments” are widespread at least in villages and smaller cities 
(Holler 1981: 127; Elander and Stig 1991; Mouritzen 1991). 
However, exactly these conditions offer good conditions for subjecting 
our de-ideologization hypotheses to especially harsh procedures of falsi-
fication. In other words: if high (and increasing) degrees of ideology are 
found on the level of local parties, we may safely conclude that they may 
even be more (rather than less) pronounced on supralocal levels. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In the following, we want to explore some factors that determine to what 
extent the issue positions, goals and action courses of political parties are 
structured by ideological constraints.
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Following Federico and Schneider (2007), two dimensions of ideologi-
cal attitude-structuring may be distinguished:
“Horizontal Constraints”: Or “Political Belief Consistency” (Converse 
1964).
This concept relates to the degree to which issue opinions among are inter-
related among each other. In operational terms, such constraints reach their 
maximum when knowing the opinion on issue A allows me to predict with 
certainty the opinions on issues B, C, D, ... to Z, and they are minimal when 
no predictions are possible because intercorrelations are zero. Evidently, 
horizontal constraints can effectively be assessed by factor-analytic meth-
ods that explore to what degree intercorrelation matrices between issue 
opinions can be reduced to very few common dimensions.
“Vertical Constraints”: Or “Level of Conceptualization” (Converse 
1964)
This concept refers to the degree to which attitudes to specific issues are 
related to higher-order ideological concepts like “liberalism” vs. “con-
servatism” or “left vs. right”. In operational terms, it can be measured by 
the certainty and precision with which the placement on such ideological 
scales can be predicted when opinions on all particular issues (A, B, C, ... 
to Z) are known. Evidently, such assessments call for multivariate regres-
sion methods that allow measuring the cumulative explanatory power of 
all the issues in questions.
Minimal ideologization would be defined as a totally unconstrained 
political standing where the opinion about each issue is generated inde-
pendently and without guidance by superordinate “Weltanschauungen” or 
programmatic structures: on the basis of its own intrinsic merits and by 
adapting to particular needs and problems, current trends in the media or 
demoscopic surveys, and specific situational conditions. Evidently, such 
openness would have to be paid with heavy loads of permanent informa-
tion gathering, communication and consensus-building procedures, and it 
will make it difficult for a party to formulate programs and to establish and 
maintain a consistent a clear-cut public identity. 
Theoretically, these two aspects could vary independently of each other. 
Thus, dense horizontal clusterings could be found without any relation to 
more abstract ideological notions, or issue positions may be tightly coupled 
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to ideological concepts despite the fact that they are mutually unrelated. 
However, notions like “leftism” or “rightism” always imply a combination 
(and positive covariation) of horizontal clusterings and vertical couplings.
On a general level, it has to be expected that in contrast to supralocal 
(especially national) party organizations, local parties may well maintain a 
much lower level of ideology, because in the realm of community politics, 
issues are often defined as non-political problems to be solved by mere 
common sense or technical expertise (Vidich and Bensman 1968; Geser 
2003).
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that local parties are basically also 
subject to the same patterns of one-dimensional left-right polarity as it is 
reigning in the encompassing political system.
Thus, the following hypotheses will be tested:
A certain degree of horizontal as well as vertical ideologization is 
present among all political parties, and these clustering’s and con-   
straints can be unambiguously identified in conventional terms of 
“left” vs. right”.
This main ideological dimension encompasses a broad range of 
“materialist” as well as “postmaterialist” issue positions. Other ide-
ological dimensions (e. g. related to social liberalism, ecologism, 
international openness etc.) may also be found, but they are likely to 
be of secondary importance.
We acknowledge the possibility that there are asymmetries between 
“leftism” and “rightism” in the degree of ideologization. On the one         
hand, we are open for the notion that “conservatives are the real dog-
matists” because they have a heightened need for cognitive struc-
tures and a decreased capacity to tolerate ambiguity and change (e. 
g. Tomkins 1963; Wilson 1973; Altemeyer 1998; Jost et al. 2003, 
2008). On the other hand, we take into account the thorough em-
pirical evidence that falsifies such claims: e. g. the impressionis-
tic historical regularity that leftist (e. g. socialist and communist) 
movements and parties have been forerunners in political ideolo-
gization since the middle of the 19th century, while ideologies on 
the rightist side (including national socialism) were mainly reactive 
and have remained on lower levels of coherence and consistency. 
This latter regularity has been corroborated by several studies that 
have found vertical couplings between issue positions and ideologi-
1.
2.
3.
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cal self-placement to be much stronger on the left-to-center than on 
the center-to-right section of the left-right scale (see Laponce 1981: 
58ff; Geser 1992; Potter 2001).
Ideologization patterns are conditioned by various characteristics of 
the social and cultural setting within which parties operate. Given 
the notoriously low salience of ideological thinking in (especially 
rural) communal politics (Vidich and Bensman 1968; Holler 1981), 
we will expect ideology to become more prominent with increasing 
city size and increasing degree of “communal politicization”. 
Similarly, we take into consideration the possibility that political ide-
ology is predominantly articulated in the very centers of society and 
by the more educated strata (Converse 1964; Laponce 1981: 158ff.; 
Gerring 1997; Bishop 2005). Thus, we expect higher ideology when 
larger percentages of party activists have higher educational degrees 
and stem from modern sectors of the economy.
In municipalities of given size, ideological constraints will rise with 
the number of competing political parties for two reasons. First, 
every single party has more leeway to appeal to special electorate 
groups and give priority to internal purity and coherence, because it 
has not to take the overall perspective of the total community. Sec-
ondly – following the functional theory of Fuchs and Klingemann 
(1990) – parties in complex political systems have to streamline and 
simplify their positions and programs, so that citizens are better able 
to make electoral decisions without having to gather and synthesize 
much information.
We remember Lerner’s finding that ideological thinking is most pro-
nounced within marginal (e. g. cultural) elites not involved in far-
reaching (political or economic) decisions (see above). This could 
result from the fact that high policy involvement creates pressures 
to adapt pragmatically to particular problems and situational con-
ditions, while powerlessness offers better opportunities to preserve 
“ideological purity” because no full “reality tests” have to be faced. 
By following this argumentation, it can be assumed that conditions 
for maintaining coherent ideological beliefs may be better when a 
party doesn’t actively participate in executive political power, or 
when its share of formal power is rather small. 
4.
5.
6.
7.
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Impressed by the widely articulated mantra of “ideological revivals” 
(Hinich and Munger 1994; McCarthy et al. 2006; Baldassarri and 
Bearman 2007; etc.), we would not be surprised to find that degrees 
of horizontal and vertical ideological constraints have increased 
rather than diminished over time. 
Data and Variables
The following empirical study is based on two mailed-out surveys (con-
ducted in 1989 and 2002) that have included all (about 5’000) local party 
sections in all (about 2’800) Swiss communities of all three linguistic re-
gions. The questionnaires were sent by mail to the current heads of these 
sections. They were asked to provide information about the political goals 
and values of their grouping as well as on its membership composition, 
internal organizational structure, political activities and relationship to the 
supralocal party levels.
As the return was about 50% in both waves, a rather large sample of 
more than 2’600 units was achieved: providing the basis for testing rig-
orously a manifold of hypotheses with multivariate statistical procedures 
(Table 1).
8.
Language region: 1989 2002
German 2’039 1’994
French 3’36 399
Italian 263 262
Total 2’638 2’655
Table 1: Sample size of local party sections 1989 and 2002, according to linguistic region
Among many other questions, respondents were asked to place their 
party section on a left-right scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (ex-
treme right).
As seen from Table 2, more than 95% of all participants were ready 
and able to provide such a judgment, and the whole range of values was 
actually used.
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Value on the Left-Right Scale No
Answer1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1989 1.3 5.1 11.6 10.0 13.3 18.6 16.7 14.0 3.4 1.7 4.3
2002 1.8 6.1 13.2 9.2 13.2 17.2 18.7 14.1 2.7 0.9 2.9
N (1989)
N (2002)
33
47
133
154
301
335
260
233
346
335
485
438
434
475
363
360
88
69
45
24
113
75
Table 2: Distribution of local parties on the left-right scale (according to the judgment of the 
party president) 1989 and 2002: percentage values
Comparing the two waves, there can be concluded that
the notion of “left vs. right” seems to have increased somewhat in 
salience, because the share of non-respondents has considerably de-
clined (from 4.3 to 2.9 percent);
only minor changes have occurred in the overall distribution; in 
particular, extremely leftist and moderately rightist groupings have 
slightly increased, while sections on the extreme right have lost 
ground.
Secondly, informants had to indicate the opinions reigning within their 
groupings on a manifold of crucial political issues known to be associ-
ated with positions of “left” and “right”. Nine of the issues were related to 
national policies, while the remaining six were focusing on issues on the 
communal level.
“In favor” and “against” means that a stable and considerable majority 
is active members are (dis)agreeing on the issue, so that the party section as 
a whole can follow consistently these political lines. “Mixed” means that 
either no secure and stable majority exists for either position, so that there 
is no reliable basis for consistent political action. 
Given the shifts of the political agenda, some new issues had to be in-
cluded in 2002, so that only ten out of 15 issue positions can be compared 
over time.
Looking at Table 3, it is remarkable that the frequency distributions on 
most items are highly skewed. Social desirability factors may well have 
effected that informants were inclined to “agree” to any items proposed: so 
•
•
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that results may have been somewhat different when alternative (negative) 
formulations would have been used. 
As in Table 2, a closer inspection shows that no clear overall shifts to 
the left or the right have occurred in the critical period, While support for 
some leftist demands (budget expansion, closing of nuclear power plants) 
has increased, welfare commitments to immigrants have declined and crit-
ics of the Swiss financial sector (under heavy international attack because 
of its banking secrecy practices) have lost ground.
Considering the semi-nominal character of these opinion scales, non-
parametric methods of analysis have to be applied.
For assessing the horizontal constraints (i.e. interrelations between 
variables), Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) seems an adequate 
procedure because it parallels factor analysis in reducing intercorrelation 
matrices to a minimum number of dimensions: with factor scores that indi-
cate the relationship of each variable vis-à-vis these extracted factors, and 
inertia values that measure the percentage of total variance explained by 
each factor.
The vertical constraints are assessed by correlating issue opinions with 
the values of the left-right scale by using Spearman’s rank correlation coef-
ficients rho, and by calculating a multiple linear regression equation with 
the LR scale as the dependent variable. Using regression methods seems 
unproblematic because the (approximately normally distributed) left-right 
scale may well be treated as an interval variable, and because the method 
is known to be quite robust when nonparametric predictors are included 
(Labowitz 1970; Anderson 1984).
Additional data used in this study are taken from Federal census data of 
1990 and 2000, and from several Swiss community surveys conducted in 
1988, 1994 and 2005. In these mailed-out surveys, the central civil service 
officials (“Gemeindeschreiber”) were asked to provide information about 
the formal political and administrative structure as well as about informal 
political processes in their community and its relation to the supralocal 
political levels.
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Empirical Results
Basic Ideological Constraints in the Total Sample
By exploring our first hypothesis, Table 4 shows that very pronounced 
constraints exist on the left side of the ideological spectrum. The dense 
interrelationships between the 15 issue opinions (horizontal constraints) 
are manifested by a very strong first factor that absorbs 46.7% of the total 
variance and shows positive factor loadings by all variables included. Such 
clusterings go along with strong vertical constraints as they are visible in 
the high correlation of each issue variable with the self placement value on 
the LR scale and in the high cumulative statistical explanation achieved 
by the multivariate regression in which all issue variables are included as 
predictors (64.5%). Thus, hypotheses 1 and 2 are fully confirmed at least 
for the left-center section of the ideological axis.
On the other hand, no equivalent patterns of rightist ideology can be 
found. While the MCA procedure produces also a predominant first fac-
tor, its explanatory power (25.6%) as well as its scope is on a much lower 
level. Similarly, vertical couplings to the left-right dimension are so loose 
that by including all predictors in a linear regression, just 18% of the total 
variance in LR placement can be explained. Thus, hypothesis 3, postulat-
ing lower degrees of ideology on the center-right section of the scale, is 
strongly corroborated. 
Evidently, our data are quite efficient to tap the ideological polarization 
between leftism and centrist political positions, while they are inadequate 
to account for differences between centrist parties and the extreme right. 
As these results conform with several other studies (mentioned above), 
they invite the question whether are caused just by a biased selection of 
political issues, or whether they reflect the fact that “rightism” is more 
defined by elements of verbal and behavioral ” styles” rather than by sub-
stantive stances toward political issues and goals.
However, all speculations that the traditional LR dimensions may be 
challenged by other dimensions are refuted. While a second sector has 
been extracted in both scale sections, its profile is very weak and it is nei-
ther related to ecologism nor to social liberalism or to nationalist-interna-
tionalist aspects as they have been postulated by different scholars (see 
above section 2).
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The Impact of Community Size and Communal “Politicization”
Looking at the impact of community size in the left-center part of the LR 
scale (Table 5a), it is evident that horizontal as well as vertical couplings 
are less pronounced in smaller than in middle-sized municipalities, and 
reach maximal values in cities with more than 15’000 inhabitants. In addi-
tion, some shifts in the content of leftist ideology can be observed insofar 
as “urban leftism” is more tightly associated with the demand for expand-
ing the budget for culture and with negative attitudes toward tax cuts and 
the expansion of public security measures (while the classical socialist is-
sue of “worker empowerment” loses ground).
However, a rather generalized tendency of leftist ideologization seems 
to go along with increasing city size: encompassing 12 out of 15 items in 
the case of horizontal coupling and 13 out of 15 issues in the realm of verti-
cal constraints.
Inspecting the center-right part of the LR scale (Table 5b), it is evident 
that rightist ideologies are rather weak in smaller as well as middle-sized 
communities, while winning considerable ground above the level of 15’000 
inhabitants. In these larger settings, being “rightist” means particularly: fa-
voring nuclear energy and tax cuts, and opposing public budget expansion, 
help for asylum seekers as well as subsidized kid daycare facilities and 
Swiss membership in the EU.
As a summary, we may conclude that larger city size promotes ideo-
logical structuring on both sides of the LR scale, but somewhat more so 
in the vertical than in the horizontal dimension. Evidently, hypothesis 4 is 
fully confirmed.
Especially in smaller settings, community affairs are widely considered 
as nonpolitical issues to be settled by common sense, technical rationality 
or by applying supralocal legal rules and administrative procedures: so that 
there is no place for power play and controversies on the level of values 
and goals (Geser 2003). Under such conditions, we expect that the need for 
ideological structuring is much less than in settings where “real politics” 
like on cantonal or the national level takes place (hypothesis 4).
For tapping this variable, party heads were asked whether according to 
their own judgment, community issues were (overall) “nonpolitical ques-
tions”. Not unexpectedly, respondents who disagreed were more likely to 
stem from leftist and urban than from rightist and nonurban parties, so 
that it is indispensable to control these two variables in order to find out 
whether “community politicization” is an independent causal factor.
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Inspecting Table 6, it is evident that in municipalities of various sizes, 
the degree of horizontal ideological structuring tends to be higher when 
community affairs are defined in political (rather than technical, legal or 
administrative) terms. These trends are similarly strong in the left and the 
right section of the LR scale. In the vertical dimension, however, the results 
are much less consistent, except in the largest size category (5–10’000 in-
habitants) where the salience of “left” and “right” reaches maximum levels 
when a highly politicized interpretation of community matters prevails. In 
addition, Table 6 makes clear that the higher levels of ideology found in 
leftist parties and sections in larger communities are partially caused by the 
higher politicization levels of these same groupings, because divergences 
shrink considerably when this variable is controlled. Especially vertical 
couplings remain weak in all size categories when an apolitical interpreta-
tion of community matters is maintained.
Membership Composition
The well-documented empirical regularity that educated people lean to-
ward more pronounced ideological thinking (hypothesis 5) is only par-
tially reproduced. In small communities with less than 2’000 inhabitants, 
horizontal as well as vertical constraints increase dramatically with rising 
percentages of highly educated active members, when the total sample is 
included (Table 7a). While this regularity may at least partially be caused 
by the higher educational level in leftist groupings, it persists on the left 
scale section when the ideological direction of the party is controlled. All 
this contrasts with the conditions in middle-sized communities where over-
all impacts of education are weaker and more articulated on the center-
right section of the scale (Table 7b).
Apart from formal education, we may speculate that insofar as high 
political ideologization is a correlate of modern urban society, we will find 
that it is less pronounced in parties where a large percentage of members 
stem from “traditional” occupations. For testing this hypothesis, we calcu-
late the percentage of active members who are farmers or self-employed 
(excluding free professionals who are of course more numerous in mod-
ernized settings).
Similar to Table 7, Table 8 shows that such occupational impacts are 
strongest in the smallest communities. Here, trends toward tight ideology 
are highest in (leftist as well as rightist) party sections in which the share of 
traditional occupational strata is insignificant or zero. In middle-sized set-
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tings, however (Table 8b), such impacts can only be found in groupings on 
the center-right section of the LR scale – similar to Table 7b which shows 
the same asymmetry in the case of education.
These findings conform well with the argument that leftist ideologies 
have always been conceived as a ready-made, highly explicit constructions 
easy to grasp by lowly-educated people (e. g. unionized workers), while 
rightist, conservative ideologies tend to be less formal, so that their grasp-
ing and precise definition depends more on factors of individual motiva-
tion and skills.
Complexity of the Communal Party System
Functionalist theories predict that the salience of the left-right dimension 
increases with the complexity of the political system, because it provides 
an easy categorical scheme for comparing and evaluating large numbers of 
political positions, politicians, regimes or political parties (hypothesis 6). 
By synthesizing their issue positions to highly structured bundles labeled 
as “leftist”, centrist” or “rightist”, even less interested voters can easily 
make up their mind about their preferences without engaging in cumber-
some information gathering and multidimensional evaluations.
While the high correlations of ideological constraints with city size may 
well be partially explained by the fact that larger communities tend to have 
more local parties, the number of parties may well be a determinative fac-
tor independent of size.
As seen from Table 9a and b, this hypothesis is only borne out for leftist 
ideology in smaller communities between 2’000 and 5’000 inhabitants3, 
while no effects are visible in larger communities and in the right section 
of the scale. 
We may speculate that in more sizable communities, ideological ten-
dencies are sufficiently supported by other factors (e. g. the high politiciza-
tion of community affairs (see 6.3)), so that intracommunal factors like the 
number of local party sections is no longer decisive.
3 Communities with less than 2’000 inhabitants have not been analyzed because of their 
rather rudimentary party system.
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Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Community size left-center scale section
center-right 
scale section
left-center 
scale section
center-right 
scale section
1989 2002 1989 2002 1989 2002 1989 2002
-2’000 inhabitants 0.332 0.420 0.246 0.273 0.45 0.53 0.06 0.11
2’001–10’000 inh. 0.392 0.505 0.276 0.288 0.57 0.66 0.23 0.17
10’001+ inh. 0.409 0.530 0.299 0.394 0.55 0.63 0.27 0.32
Power Position of the Party Within the Community
In well established democracies like Switzerland, cynical sayings like 
“Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Baron Acton 
1887) may only have limited relevance, but they may not be completely 
mistaken. As in all political systems, parties that without any share in po-
litical power have least difficulty in maintaining “ideological purity”, be-
cause they are not involved in “compromising” decisions and because their 
responsibility extends just to their members and voter clienteles, not to the 
community as a whole. By contrast, parties reigning with absolute major-
ity tend to shift ideological points of views into the background, because 
they have to adapt to all sorts of pragmatic considerations (e. g. caused by 
financial scarcities or organizational deficits) and because they or obliged 
to focus on the general welfare of the whole population (hypothesis 7).
Therefore, we expect a negative correlation between a party’s share of 
formal power (operationalized by the percentage of seats it holds in the 
communal executive board) and its degree of ideologization.4 
As seen in Table 10, hypothesis 7 is borne out very strongly in the total 
sample, but much less in the subsamples representing the left and the right 
section of the scale. Evidently, the total sample effect is mainly caused by 
the regularity that powerless parties are more likely to be leftist parties 
– which maintain higher degrees of ideology irrespective of any other con-
ditions. Among rightist parties however, the expected trend seems to hold: 
sections have lowest levels of horizontal clustering and vertical couplings 
4 In order to eliminate concomitant size effects (due to the larger number of minority par-
ties in larger municipalities), only communities between 2’000 and 10’000 inhabitants are 
included.
Table 12: Changes in horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in the left and right sec-             
tion of the LR scale, according to size of community: comparing waves 1989 and 2002
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when they control over 50% (equal to the absolute majority) of the execu-
tive seats.
Recent and Current Changes in Ideologization
Given that opinions on ten (out of 15) issues have been measured in both 
waves of the Swiss party surveys, changes in the degree and kind of party 
ideology occurring in the period 1989–2002 can be assessed at least in the 
realm of “stable” issues that have been salient at both points of time.
As seen from Table 11, horizontal as well as vertical ideological struc-
turing has significantly increased on the left side of the spectrum, while on 
the right scale section; changes are weak in the case of MCA factor cluster-
ings and completely inexistent in the covariations between issue positions 
and LR placements.
Most interestingly, leftism has become more and more defined in terms 
of “materialist” aspects (especially related to governmental tax and budget 
policy), while the relevance of “postmaterialist” issues (like nuclear or 
gender policy) has not much shifted. This trend contradicts evidently any 
“New Politics” conceptions which predict that leftism has been increasing-
ly redefined in terms of postsocialist dimensions like “ecologism”, “social 
liberalism” and the like. A conspicuous exception is the classical socialist 
item of “worker empowerment” that has lost ground – maybe because tra-
ditional working class structures have eroded.
Table 12 shows that the rise in leftist ideology has taken place in com-
munities of all size categories, while on the right side, increases in ideolo-
gization haves only occurred in urban settings. In addition, the impression 
is corroborated that changes since the late 80ies have mainly resulted in 
increasing the tightness of clusterings among issue opinions, while verti-
cal couplings to the left-right dimension have been less affected. Thus, 
hypothesis 8 is only partially confirmed.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to explore the strength and causal determinants 
of ideological thinking within political parties. By focusing on local par-
ty sections, we address a hitherto much neglected intermediate layer of 
the political system: located between the total voting population (or party 
members) on the one hand and the “real” political elites on the other.
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Given the highly pluralized party systems in Switzerland (generated by 
a decentralized Federalism as well as by proportional election laws); it is 
not to be expected that this country is a forerunner in the emergence of de-
ideologized “catch-all parties” (Kirchheimer 1965). However, the results 
presented above show shockingly high trends of ideologization at least on 
the left-center section of the spectrum, especially in the vertical dimension. 
Thus, more than 64 percent of the variance in LR-scale placements be-
tween 1 and 6 can be explained with 15 issue predictors. By contrast, right-
ist ideologies are much less articulated, as the explanatory power of these 
same predictors (for scale values spreading between 5 and 10) doesn’t sur-
pass 18%. Urbanization stands out as a major causal factor: on both sides 
of the spectrum, as ideological constraints are significantly higher in larger 
than in smaller communities. However, this seems to be largely due to the 
fact that more “political” interpretations of communal issues prevails in 
urban communities – so that size effects are dramatically reduced when the 
“degree of politicization” is controlled.
City size is also a potent intervening variable. Thus, only in rather small 
communities, it is found that ideologization correlates positively with the 
educational level and the modern occupational background of party mem-
bers and with the number of other local parties with which they have to 
compete. Evidently, the politicization effects going along with larger com-
munity size are sufficient causes of ideologization: overriding many other 
effects that are visible when such impacts are very weak. While ideological 
thinking is boosted by politicization, it is paradoxically attenuated by high 
degrees of political power. Thus, it is lowest in the case of parties that en-
joy an absolute majority in the municipal executive board.
There is strong evidence that ideological constraints in party policy 
have increased since the late eighties of the last century in communities 
of all size. 
The historian Michael Hunt (1990) defines ideology as “an interrelated 
set of convictions or assumptions that reduces . . . complexities . . . to eas-
ily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with 
(them)”. As these needs for reducing complexities are certainly persisting 
– and most likely to increase in these times of multiplying issues and turbu-
lent political processes – ideologies are likely to survive even when there 
is no basis for consistent ordering or deductive subsumption. Especially on 
the left side of the spectrum, we see not only the persistence, but even the 
ongoing tightening of “heteromorphic” ideologies encompassing a multi-
tude of issue stances not intrinsically related to each other. In contrast to 
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classical socialism or liberalism, many items seem to be chosen on an ad 
hoc basis, and they may easily be eliminated and substituted as a conse-
quence of changing political fads and fashions. 
The focus on “complexity reduction” helps also to cast doubt on all 
assertions that ideological thinking is a correlate of higher political knowl-
edge and sophistication. To the contrary: it indicates 
a deplorable lack of pragmatism as it is often cultivated in cohesive 
sect-like groupings that have no access to political decisions;
a deficit of autonomous thinking that may be associated with weak 
personality systems as well as with social conformity pressures (e.g. 
“group think” tendencies as they often exist within tightly integrated 
elites).
In contradiction to most conventional wisdom, we may tentatively con-
clude that political thinking may be more “rational” at the peripheries than 
in the more central spheres of modern societies. It is in the smaller commu-
nities and among party members with traditional occupational backgrounds 
where there is most readiness to evaluate every issue on its own merits and 
to adapt opinions pragmatically to specific circumstances: irrespective of 
wider social pressures and ideological constraints. 
The more we move from the countryside to the larger cities and from 
farmers and the petty bourgeoisie to modern professionals and employees, 
the higher is the disposition to simplify such evaluation processes by as-
similating whole bundles of opinions: like choosing among a very small 
number of prefabricated fashionable costumes. Thus, when an urban party 
section declares that it is against the promotion of Switzerland as a world-
wide center of finance, we can predict with high certainty that it is also 
fighting against nuclear power plants and sharper laws against immigration 
and supporting new daycare facilities for kids as well as the entry of Swit-
zerland to the EU – despite the fact that these issues are not intrinsically 
connected and not implicated by common encompassing principles, value 
or norms. 
We may speculate about the many dysfunctional consequences resul-
ting from this “pathology”: such as 
trends toward free-wheeling overpolarized ideological discussions 
that may contribute much more to public media entertainment than 
to the solution of current political problems;
•
•
•
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an hesitance of urban and supralocal parties to cooperate among 
each other and enter into coalitions (Holler 1981), and to adapt their 
policies pragmatically to changing circumstances, instead of cling-
ing rigidly to preformulated positions.
Of course, it seems unrealistic to transfer this “local pragmatism” to the 
urban sphere and the national level, because too many cumbersome proc-
esses of reflection, discussion, communication and negotiation would be 
needed when a wide range of issues and many political actors are involved. 
Wherever “real politics” is at stake, the demand for ideological simplifi-
cation will certainly remain high – and is likely to increase further in the 
future, because the rising number and volatility of political issues collides 
ever more sharply with the invariantly low individual and collective capac-
ities to process information and generate consensual judgments. Increasing 
these capacities (e. g. by ingenious applications of digital communication 
technologies) may be a key for improving the rationality of political proc-
esses at the levels where politics really takes place.
Overall, the findings lend very little support for all party development 
models that predict a decreasing salience of programs and ideology in fa-
vor of “pragmatic” adaptation to broader electoral strata and mediatized 
“personality marketing.” To the contrary, they suggest that parties are again 
sharpening their ideological profiles – at least in the Swiss environment of 
proportional voting where even minority parties are able to gain significant 
shares of formal political power. As such trends appear so strongly on the 
local level (where usually quite pragmatic notions of politics prevail), they 
are likely to be even more pronounced on supralocal levels that are known 
be more prone to ideological polarization.
Given the limited space of a scientific paper, many additional hypothe-
ses related to the determinants of ideologization trends have not been ex-
plored. In the future, we will rely on the same data set for clarifying the 
impact of various forms of political-administrative organization (e. g. di-
rect vs. representative democracy) and the divergences of different cultural 
regions.
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Ideologische Schematisierungen im Aufwind?  
Eine vergleichende und diachronische Analyse lokaler �arteien
Im Zentrum dieser empirischen Arbeit steht die Frage nach dem Ausmass und den kau-
salen Faktoren der Ideologisierung in Schweizer Lokalparteien. Das Konzept der “Ide-
ologisierung” bezieht sich einerseits auf den Grad “horizontaler Koppelung” zwischen 
verschiedenen sachpolitischen Einstellungen, und andererseits auf den Grad “verti-
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kaler Koppelung” zwischen spezifischen Sachpositionen und den abstrakteren Katego-
rien “links” und “rechts”. Die Ergebnisse zeigen sehr hohe Werte der Ideologisierung 
in der linken Hälfte des Links-Rechts- Spektrums, vor allem in der vertikalen Dimen-
sion und in grösseren Gemeinden. Nur in kleineren Gemeinden korreliert der Ideologi-
sierungsgrad positiv mit dem Bildungsgrad und dem modernen Berufshintergrund der 
Mitglieder, sowie mit der Zahl konkurrierender Parteien. Geringste Ideologisierung 
besteht erwartungsgemäss in Parteien, die in der Exekutive über einen sehr grossen 
Sitzanteil verfügen. Longitudinale Vergleichsergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass sich 
im Zeitraum 1989–2002 eine Zunahme an Ideologisierung stattgefunden hat.
Tendances croissantes vers la simplification idéologique ?  
Une analyse comparative et diachronique des partis politiques locaux en Suisse
Cet article analyse les facteurs qui influencent l’emprise des idéologies au niveau des 
partis politiques locaux en Suisse. Le concept de “degré d’idéologisation” se rap-
porte (1) aux interrelations “horizontales” qui existent entre les opinions spécifiques 
(concernant 15 questions politiques diverses), et (2) aux interrelations “verticales” en-
tre chaque opinion spécifique et le placement sur le spectre “gauche-droite”. Les résul-
tats confirment l’hypothèse selon laquelle le degré d’idéologisation est plus élevé au 
centre-gauche du spectre politique, notamment concernant la dimension verticale. En 
outre, il est possible de démontrer que l’idéologie joue un rôle plus prononcé dans les 
grandes municipalités urbanisées. Dans les petites communes, l’étude menée met en 
lumière une corrélation positive entre le degré d’idéologisation et, d’une part, le niveau 
d’éducation et le domaine d’activité professionnelle des membres des partis et, d’autre 
part, le nombre de partis locaux engagés dans la compétition électorale. Lorsque l’on 
contrôle la taille de la population, il apparaît que les partis qui disposent d’une majorité 
absolue sont moins idéologisés que les groupes qui ne détiennent que peu de mandats 
(ou aucun siège) dans l’exécutif local. Finalement, l’étude montre que les tendances à 
l’idéologisation se sont accentuées au cours de la période 1989–2002. 
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